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ARTICLE
James Moliterno | John Keyser
Why Lawyers Do What They Do (When Behaving Ethically)
Abstract. Since the early 1990s, when David Wilkins published his
influential paper “Who Should Govern Lawyers” in the Harvard Law Review,
legal ethics scholars and professors have paid attention to the range of
processes and devices that govern lawyer behavior. This Article will report on
the results of a study currently underway that seeks to provide empirical
evidence to answer the question posed in this Article’s title: Do lawyers train
staff in confidentiality preservation because they fear bar discipline? Because
they fear malpractice liability? Because they must comply with malpractice
liability carrier demands? Because they honor client confidences for their own
value and wish to protect them? Because the market forces them to do so?
Because it is the right thing to do? The same, or similar, sets of questions may
be asked about establishing conflict check procedures, devising their
marketing to stay within norms, charging reasonable fees, and other
professional ethics-related actions by lawyers. To gather data on these issues,
the authors conducted a survey of the bars of Florida and Virginia and present
on the findings.
Authors. James E. Moliterno is the Vincent L. Bradford Professor of Law
at Washington & Lee University School of Law, and serves in a leadership role
in W&L’s third year curriculum reform. For twenty-one years prior to
joining the W&L faculty in 2009, he was the Tazewell Taylor Professor of
Law, Director of the Legal Skills Program, and Director of Clinical Programs
at the College of William & Mary. Professor Moliterno was the 2012
recipient of the Rebuilding Justice Award from the Institute for the
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Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) in recognition of his
career-long legal education reform work. He is the author or co-author of ten
books including The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and
Responses to Change (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) and of numerous articles on
legal ethics and legal education. He has engaged in substantial international
legal ethics and legal education reform work in Serbia, Armenia, Georgia, the
Czech Republic, Kosovo, Slovakia, Spain, Japan, China, Indonesia and
Thailand.
John Keyser earned a B.S. and M.S. degree from Virginia Tech in
Sociology with concentrations in Criminology and Quantitative Methods.
He taught in and coordinated the Criminal Justice program and was the
Assistant Director of the Center for Community Research at Roanoke
College. He was the founder and President of BKW Research Group, a social
and marketing research firm in Virginia. He moved to Washington and Lee
in 1997 where he served most recently as the Associate Dean for
Administration. In his capacity as the Associate Dean, John oversaw
Institutional Research, Finance, Facilities and Technology Services.

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. The Survey Instrument and Its Distribution. . . . . . . . . 9
III. The Results and Their Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Respondents by Age, Gender, Type of Practice . . 10
B. General Observations from the Data . . . . . . . . . . . 11
C. Question by Question, Some Predictable
Results Regarding the Measure of Concern for
Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
D. Differences by Age, Gender, Practice Size and
Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3

1 MOLITERNO_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN

4

6/24/2014 10:48:13 AM

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 4:2

I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the early 1990s, professional responsibility courses in law
schools focused almost exclusively on the ABA model ethics codes and
sometimes local state codes. Even at that, such courses had come a long
way since the days when they were an exercise in “chanting the Canons”
for no credit.1
In the late 1970s, as part of the post-Watergate credibility-restoration
scramble, the ABA mandated that law schools require a professional
responsibility course for graduation.2
Prior to any Watergate revelations, there was a watered down draft of
section 302 in existence.3 However, the draft that existed before the full
Watergate affair came to light did not mandate that law schools require a
course in lawyer ethics; it merely required that law schools offer such a
course, along with several others.4 The amendment to the draft resolution
came during the February 1973 floor debate5 when a motion brought by
the State Bar of Arizona was passed in the House of Delegates. Thus, the
weak draft that existed before Watergate became a much stronger mandate
by floor action in 1973, by which time there were new Watergate
revelations emerging almost daily. Although it did not begin hearings
until May, the Senate Select Committee (chaired by Sam Ervin) was
formed on February 7, 1973.6 A month earlier still, when Judge Sirica
opened the Watergate burglars’ trial on January 7, federal investigators
already knew of the CREEP (Committee to Re-Elect the President) slush
fund used to finance illegal activities against Democrats.7 The convictions
1. See Lawrence A. Dubin, Professionalism Among Lawyers: The Law School's Role, 68 MICH.
B.J. 850, 851 (1989) (recalling the academic futility of attending classes related to legal ethics).
2. JAMES MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND
RESPONSES TO CHANGE ch. 5 (Oxford 2013).
3. 98 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 351, 354 (1973).
4. See id. at 353–54 (“The law school shall offer: (i) instruction in those subjects generally
regarded as the core of the law school curriculum, (ii) training in professional skills, such as
counseling, the drafting of legal documents and materials, and trial and appellate advocacy, (iii)
instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession.”).
5. See House Disapproves UMAVRA, Supports the Exclusionary Rule, and Adopts New Law School
Standards, 59 A.B.A. J. 384, 390 (1973) (“The house then voted to amend paragraph 302 in that
form, so that subparagraph (a) (iii) as adopted reads: and provide and require for all student
candidates for a professional degree instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal
profession.”).
6. Chronology: 1973, WATERGATE.INFO., http://watergate.info/chronology1973-chronology
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
7. The Watergate Files, The Watergate Trial: Overview, GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY & MUSEUM,
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/content.php?section=1&page=
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of McCord and Liddy were entered on January 30.8 As far back as August
1, 1972, the Washington Post reported that funds meant for CREEP had
been deposited in a Watergate burglar’s account.9 Regarding the floor
amendment adoption in 1973, ABA President Robert Meserve said that
this amendment evidenced the ABA’s “desire that there be greater law
school emphasis on the teaching of professional responsibility.”10
Although it is fair to say that the major revelations were yet to come when
the ethics course requirement was adopted in February 1973, the lawyerinvolvement in Watergate was clearly exposed. “In August 1974, in the
wake of Watergate, the following specification was added to the Standard,
‘Such required instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical method
as long as the history, goals, structure and responsibilities of the legal
profession and its members, including [the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility] are all covered.’”11
That move, along with the contemporaneous rapid development and
adoption of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE), gave
new credibility to the course, long a stepchild of the rest of the
curriculum.12
Casebooks and course books proliferated when only few had existed
prior to the ABA accreditation move.13 Careers were adjusted and formed

a (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
8. Id.
9. Brief Timeline of Events, WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info/chronology/brief.shtml
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
10. Robert W. Meserve, President’s Page, 59 A.B.A. J. 327, 327 (1973).
11. Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 T ENN .
L. R EV. 1099, 1123 (1997) (citing SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM.
BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF’L DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM 262, 263 (Report of the
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992)).
12. Id. See generally Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing
the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299 (2003) (tracing the major currents that spurred
the MPRE’s development).
13. The original casebook in the field was ELLIOT CHEATHAM, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Edmund M. Morgan et al. eds., 1938). Within a few
years of the accreditation requirement, the books proliferated. A few of the more prominent books
include: GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Davis L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1981); ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL.,
BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONALISM (Colum. U. Sch. of L. Project for the Study of Application of Humanistic Educ.
in L. et al. eds., 1980); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (1985); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989); THOMAS L. SHAFFER
& R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986). In 2014, there are scores more.
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for new faculty who were pressed into service to teach the new course,
which was outside their core expertise.14
Standard 302 is broad in terms of teaching methodology and narrow in
terms of subject matter focus. Coverage was required of the “history,
goals, structure and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members,
including [the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility].”15 There was
no mention of the various other controls on lawyer conduct, such as
malpractice liability, litigation sanctions, contempt of court, and so on.16
The main focuses, beyond history and structure, were the provisions of the
ABA Model Code—the dominant model for lawyer discipline
enforcement.
The narrow subject matter focus was natural: after all, the American
legal profession has long claimed self-governance through the state bars
and supreme courts’ enforcement of the profession-drafted ethics codes.
Even in the face of evidence to the contrary, the profession has clung to
this image of lawyers governing lawyers, reporting their fellows’
misdeeds.17 Naturally, the ABA’s accreditation standard focused on the
self-governance aspects of the law governing lawyers.
That was the state of the ethics-teaching art until the early 1990s when
the almost exclusive focus on the ABA codes and the disciplinary process
changed as a result of David Wilkins’ groundbreaking article, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?18 The article laid out the reality that the ethics codes
14. Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda, for example, were beginning faculty
members at the University of Chicago Law School when the accreditation requirement was adopted.
They were asked to teach the new lawyer ethics course and launched prominent careers in the field,
with their problem-based course book becoming one of the leading authorities. See generally
THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed.
2011) (discussing problems in professional responsibility).
15. Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 T ENN .
L. R EV. 1099, 1123 (1997) (citing SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM.
BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF’L DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM 262, 263 (Report of the
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992)).
16. See id. (mentioning only the specific requirement for professional values).
17. Compare Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in
Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 461–62 (1996)
(“Lawyers refer to their profession as ‘self-regulating,’ but this term is misleading as well as wishful.”),
with Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243,
1250–51 (2014) (advancing that the “bar’s system of self-regulation [has] balanced lawyers’
competing duties to clients, the state, and the public” and furthermore that the bar has
“demonstrated how its system of self-regulation balanced lawyers’ tripartite duties in furtherance of
rule-of-law values”).
18. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1992) (exploring how traditional attorney disciplinary agencies “have been joined by a number of
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and the disciplinary process were but one piece of what causes lawyers to
behave as they do, and perhaps in some areas of governance, just a small
piece.19 The article analyzed malpractice and other liability sources that
have very different sets of motivators both for the lawyer being disciplined
and the aggrieved party.20 For example, while the disciplinary sanctions of
disbarment and suspension are grotesquely harmful to the lawyer, they are
very rare incidents.21 Furthermore, they produce nothing more than
satisfaction for the aggrieved person or entity. In part, that explains why
the sanctions are so rare: aggrieved parties are not motivated to make
complaints.22 Indeed, corporate aggrieved parties appear to regard the
disciplinary process as a waste of time and prefer to fire lawyers who harm
their interests or file civil claims that have the potential to produce
damages.23 In part, as a result of the type of clientele for large firm
lawyers, the disciplinary process is more prominently a device for policing
the conduct of small firms and solo practitioners.24
Wilkins wrote the wonderful kind of article that causes readers to say,
“of course, how could I have missed that?” It resonated so deeply that a
raft of others followed in its footsteps.25
other systems designed to detect and deter unethical conduct”).
19. See id. at 809–11 (providing a detailed analysis of the regulation of lawyers).
20. See id. at 830–35 (analyzing sources of liability and their motivational basis for different
actors).
21. Id. at 806 n.22, 829 n.121.
22. See id. at 829 n.121 (“In such cases, in exchange for disciplinary counsel’s promise not to
seek either suspension or disbarment, the lawyer would agree to forego some of the elaborate due
process protections that currently make most disciplinary proceedings so time consuming and
expensive.”).
23. See id. at 828 n.113 (proclaiming that “aggrieved clients find disqualification motions and
civil suits ‘more attractive’ than the disciplinary system”), 828 n. 116 (“Because corporate clients have
so little incentive to report their lawyers, it is not surprising that these lawyers are rarely subject to
professional discipline. The number of elite lawyers from major corporate firms who have ever been
disciplined is exceedingly small.”).
24. See id. at 832 n.134 (“The vast majority of malpractice claims are filed against solo
practitioners or lawyers in very small firms.”).
25. The article has been cited at least 283 times. See WESTLAW KEYCITE CONTENT,
http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?cite=105+Harvard+Law+Review+801+&rs=WLW13.10&v
r=2.0&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&fn=_top&mt=208 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (showing
where Wilkins’ article has been cited). The following is a list of notable authors who wrote
specifically based on the article. See generally Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct
Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 460, 470–80 (1996) (proposing a third alternative for a uniform set of rules for professional
conduct in federal courts); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 721 (2001) (discussing the reality of prosecutor discipline); see also Benjamin Hoorn Barton,
Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct
Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001) (comparing the justifications for entry and conduct
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Once the professional responsibility professoriate had its eyes opened,
courses began to expand into teaching malpractice liability, civil litigation
sanctions (such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11), and discovery
sanctions, contempt, reversal of convictions for prosecutorial misconduct,
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and other areas. Some courses
expanded further than the law to treat subjects such as the control of
insurance companies over insurance defense lawyers—who, after all,
actually represent their insured—and even the control exercised by
malpractice insurance carriers over the lawyers they insure. The MPRE
developed modestly as well, expanding in 1999 to cover “questions of
professional responsibility aris[ing] in the context of procedural or
evidentiary issues, such as the availability of litigation sanctions or the
scope of the attorney–client evidentiary privilege . . . .”26
The course books increased also and began to cover malpractice liability,
litigation sanctions, lawyer–client evidentiary privilege and work-product
doctrine, ineffective assistance of criminal defense counsel, and prosecutor
misconduct resulting in conviction reversal.27
Knowing more about why lawyers do what they do will provide
disciplinary bodies, courts, bar associations, and the public with important
information. For example, we may be able to discover more about
allocating the proper attention and resources in furtherance of a more
efficient regulation of lawyers. Perhaps because the Wilkins insight was so
compelling, very little empirical evidence to support its assertions has been
sought. This Article and the survey on which it reports embody such an
effort. Though much more should be done, we try to provide a starting
point to answer the question: Why Do Lawyers Do What They Do? Why
do lawyers create conflict-check procedures, train staff to protect client
regualtions with the current state of regulations); James E. Moliterno, Practice Setting as an
Organizing Theme for a Law and Ethics of Lawyering Curriculum, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393
(1998) (exploring the need for centralized themes in the substantive law).
26. NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, 2013 MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EXAMINATION INFORMATION BOOKLET 10 (2013). See also Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the
(National Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1303
(2003) (“Questions of professional responsibility arise in the context of procedural or evidentiary
issues, such as the availability of litigation sanctions or the scope of the attorney–client privilege
. . . .”).
27. For further review of these course books, among many, see STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2009);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2010); JAMES E. MOLITERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS (4th ed. 2012); LISA G. LERMAN & PHILLIP SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL.,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2011).
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confidences, exercise caution in managing client funds, protect client
information, and refrain from overcharging clients?
II. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND ITS DISTRIBUTION
We set out to ask lawyers why they do what they do when they follow
ethical norms. We enlisted the assistance of the Virginia State Bar and the
Florida State Bar. While neither would sponsor nor endorse the research,
they did provide the list of emails of currently licensed Virginia and
Florida lawyers and granted us permission to use the lists.
We designed the survey instrument to be easy to complete, nonthreatening, and likely to produce useful information. (The survey
instrument we used is reproduced in Appendix A.) We described the goal
of the survey as follows:
The goal of this survey is to explore the motivation of lawyers for acting
ethically. In short, when lawyers behave ethically, why do they do so? All
responses will be anonymous and will never be linked back to the individual
respondent. The survey is being conducted for academic purposes only and
will not be shared with any state bar or agency. This survey is not being
funded by any state bar or agency. If you have any concerns or questions,
feel free to contact one of the researchers . . . .

We instructed the participants as follows:
For each of the following behaviors, distribute 100 points to represent the
relative importance of each reason why you engage in the behavior or
practice. If you do not engage in the behavior (e.g., do not have conflict
check procedures), leave the column blank. The column of percentages for
each question you answer should sum to 100%.

We then asked about lawyer behaviors. We chose the following topics
because they are issues that implicate considered choices rather than incourt, split-second decisions:
1. Having conflict-check procedures
2. Training staff to be sensitive to confidentiality issues and such
3. Maintaining proper client trust accounts
4. Not overcharging clients
5. Protecting client information
6. Using case management or other tools to meet filing and other
deadlines
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And for each activity, we gave the following options as motivators for
the behavior:
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of your malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of your clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed above (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
We then asked a series of demographic and practice-orientation
questions to enable us to parse the data by size of practice, specialty of
practice, age, and gender. And finally, because we provided different links
for the Florida and Virginia lawyers, we enabled ourselves to examine
whether there are consequential differences between those two groups.
We initially sent an email to each recipient with a link to Survey
Monkey where the survey would reside. Unfortunately, the return was
quite low, in part because a significant number of recipients mistrusted the
email as possible spam. We regrouped and sent the email again, this time
directly from our Washington & Lee email address through a campus
service for sending mass emails. Eventually, we received 347 responses
from Virginia lawyers and decided to confine our study to this group.28
As anticipated with shotgun email lists, some of the email addresses did
not hit their mark. Some produced auto replies indicating that the
intended recipient had moved or retired from law practice. Some
produced personal responses from recipients indicating that they were in
business or government settings making the survey’s questions inapt.
III. THE RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
A. Respondents by Age, Gender, Type of Practice
Respondents were well distributed by age, quite close to national
28. Because Professor Moliterno has been on the faculty of Virginia law schools (William &
Mary and Washington & Lee) since 1988, it is likely that some Virginia survey recipients are his
former students.
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distributions. Five percent might be classified as young lawyers (under
30), which is close to the number in the general lawyer population (4%).
Thirty-seven percent might be described as mid-career (between 30–49)
and the largest number 57.9%, were over fifty. The ABA breaks down the
age categories in a slightly different way, but again, the numbers are quite
close. Thirty-five percent of American lawyers are between age 30 and
44.29 Sixty-two percent are over 44.30
Almost two-thirds (64.6%) of respondents were men and just over onethird were women (35.4%). This is a reasonable reflection of the gender
demography of today’s profession (70% men, 30% women in 2005, with
the trend line indicating that the national numbers are closer to our survey
numbers in 2014).31
Respondents well represented various law practice sizes. Respondents
from small practices (1–5 lawyers) accounted for 58% of respondents.
Nineteen percent came from practices of 6-25 lawyers, and 22.7% came
from law firms of over 25 lawyers. Again, the ABA data collection breaks
the groups slightly differently, but once again, the respondents to our
survey are distributed quite closely to the national distribution.32 Sixtythree percent of American lawyers practice in groups of 1–5 lawyers; 12%
practice in groups of 6–20; and 26% practice in groups of more than
twenty lawyers.33
B. General Observations from the Data
1. Because we asked respondents to assign percentages to as many
motivating factors as they wished to identify, two measures matter in
evaluating their responses. First, it is important to know how often a
particular reason was chosen by a respondent, no matter what the
percentage of motivation they assigned. And second, it matters, perhaps
more, to know the weighted response that was assigned by the group to a
particular motivating factor. So, for example, of the 321 respondents who
answered Question 1 regarding conflict-check procedures, 235 (73% of
respondents) identified avoidance of discipline as one of their motivating
factors and 270 (84% of respondents) identified doing the right thing as
29. ABA, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2013.authcheck
dam.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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one of their motivating factors. But the average weight given to avoiding
discipline was about 20%, while the average weight given to doing the
right thing was about 50%, so the weighted score for the two factors was
4743 (about twenty points times 235 respondents who listed this
motivating factor) and 13568 (about fifty points times 270 respondents
who listed this motivating factor) respectively, making doing the right
thing arguably 2.9 times as important as avoiding discipline. So while
doing the right thing motivates only 11% more respondents than avoiding
discipline, it motivates them as a group much more powerfully. The
weighted-motivation analysis will be emphasized question by question in
this paper.
2. Overall, “doing the right thing” was the most powerful single
motivator of conduct, although the combination of all legal sanctions was
more powerful still. On every topic, doing the right thing was by far the
greatest weighted motivator, averaging 44% of the motivation across the
six questions. Except for Question 6, regarding meeting deadlines, where
both malpractice and litigation sanction motivators were at their peak, the
doing the right thing motivation was close to the equal of all other
motivations combined. As expressed a number of times in the written
comments, our respondents believe that lawyers should do the right thing
for their clients without regard to the sanctions that may be available. This
finding and the observation that market forces account for the second
highest motivation (17% overall) calls into question the role of law. Thus,
the actual “law” is well less than half (about 32% in our survey) the total
motivation for lawyers to charge reasonable fees, meet deadlines, protect
confidences, and avoid conflicts of interest.
3. A large number of respondents identified “another reason [not listed
among the choices]” as a motivating factor. The only way to evaluate these
other reasons is to read the written responses that identify them. Here, it
appears that much of the time, the respondents have actually elaborated on
one or more of the listed reasons. For example, many respondents who
identified “another reason” as their motivation for having conflicts-check
procedures suggested that if they failed to catch a conflict early on, they
would eventually need to withdraw to the detriment of themselves and
their clients.34 Of course the reasons they would have to later withdraw
34. One respondent said, for example,
Because I will have to withdraw. For example, it’s not fair to me or the client to go into a
matter without knowing that I can finish it. If I find in the middle of a matter that there is a
conflict, I’m out of there and it doesn’t help anybody. It happened once when two separated
parents with different last names each wanted to be the guardian for their adult handicapped
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would be to avoid discipline, avoid malpractice, etc. Thus, these
respondents blended their responses by elucidating their reasoning rather
than by parsing the percentage owing to the reasons we listed in the survey.
Others, who identified the “another reason” motivator, simply restated
in their own words a factor we had listed on the survey. One, for example,
listed as the “other reason,” “I use my belief in virtue and morality.” This
reason might as well have been captured by a positive response to “doing
the right thing.” Another identified “Important to comply with rules of
ethics” as the “other reason,” which might be a proxy for avoiding
discipline, but might also have been a generalized response that many of
our listed factors were at play for this respondent.
Still others saw the question in terms slightly different than we
intended. For example, a few identified mandates of superiors as their
“other reason” for using conflicts checks. “Complies with my firm policy,”
and “A basic must-do” were listed as “other reasons.” Our goal was to get
at the reasons that underlie why it is a firm policy or a basic “must-do.”
These respondents did not go underneath the mandates of others.
Although a significant number of respondents identified “another
reason,” overall they gave little weight to those other reasons. As indicated,
often the other reason was no more than the aggregate of the available
reasons on the survey. As a result, responses of “another reason” have been
factored out of the findings in the remainder of this paper.
4. The fear of discipline does vary by the lawyering activity, and in ways
that suit predictions. For many activities (i.e., conflict checks, training
staff, meeting deadlines, and protecting confidences), fear of discipline
provides a modest 12 or 13% of the motivation to behave ethically. But
for maintaining client trust accounts, an activity that is monitored by the
bar association and that produces especially harsh disciplinary
consequences, the discipline-avoidance motivation leaps to double the
usual (24%). On the other end, regarding overcharging clients, where the
bar discipline has been, historically, rare, the discipline-avoidance
motivation dips to an almost non-existent 3%.

child. I gave each their money back from my trust account, then had to scramble to make
expenses. They have never followed through with the matter.
See generally Survey Results (on file with the author) (evaluating the answers given by various
respondents).
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C. Question by Question, Some Predictable Results Regarding the Measure of
Concern for Discipline
Question 1. Conflict check procedures have become a staple of law
practice, especially private practice. But accepting that nearly all lawyers
engage check procedures, what motivates them to do so? About 73%
identify avoiding discipline as a factor, and on average they weigh that
factor at 15% of their motivation. Even more identify a malpracticerelated motivation, with a combined weight of 19%. Litigation sanctions
appear to account for 9% of the motivation while market-related
motivations amount to 11% of the motivation. By a substantial margin,
doing the right thing provides the greatest motivation-weight at 42%.
Question 2. Lawyers are responsible for training their staff in
confidentiality protection.35 Under the disciplinary rules, lawyers can have
liability for the failure to provide reasonable supervision.36 Under
malpractice law, lawyers can have liability for negligent breaches by staff.37
Few litigation sanctions relate to confidentiality breaches by staff. The
motivation-weights seem to reflect the law’s allocations regarding staff
breaches of confidentiality. Thirteen percent of the motivation appears to
come from discipline-avoidance; an almost identical 14% comes from
malpractice concerns, and only 6% from the fear of the unlikely litigation
sanctions. Here, market forces appear to be at play, accounting for 18% of
the motivation-weight. Again, doing the right thing motivates more than
anything else at 45%.
Question 3. Trust account violations account for some of the most
grave disciplinary consequences.38 Further, because trust accounts are
subject to bar audits, the likelihood of discovery and pursuit by bar
35. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2014) (“A lawyer must act
competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of
the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”). For further discussion, see Model Rules
1.1, 5.1, and 5.3.
36. See generally id. R. 5.1 (“Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers”);
Id. R. 5.2 (“Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer”); Id. R. 5.3 (“Responsibilities Regarding
Nonlawyer Assistants”).
37. See Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 30 P.3d 8, 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(“As long as the paralegal does in fact have a supervising attorney who is responsible for the case, any
deficiency in the quality of the supervision or in the quality of the paralegal’s work goes to the
attorney's negligence, not the paralegal’s.”).
38. Irene M. Ricci, Client Trust Funds: How to Avoid Ethical Problems, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 245, 247 (1998) (“Violations of trust account rules are one of the most common ethical
violations brought before disciplinary boards.”).
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authorities is high.39 By contrast, clients and courts rarely find out about
trust account violations unless the bar authorities have ferreted them out in
the first instance. Unsurprisingly, discipline-avoidance is the primary
motivation regarding this topic, at 24%—almost double its motivation on
most other topics. Also predictably, fear of litigation sanctions on this
topic is a very modest 5% of the total motivation, and market-related
reasons likewise are at a low point of 7%. Protection of trust accounts is
such a fundamental expectation, that presumably lawyers do not regard
themselves at any market advantage by doing what is expected of all
lawyers as a basic requirement. Doing the right thing remains the
strongest motivation at 40%, but on this topic it is well below twice the
disciplinary avoidance motivation (40–24%) while on every other topic, it
is close to three times the motivation and, in one instance, seventeen times
the motivation.
Question 4. Refraining from overcharging clients presents the most
unusual set of motivation-weights.
Avoiding discipline, avoiding
malpractice and litigation sanctions combined amount to a mere 7% of the
motivation-weight. The bar has historically been disinterested in policing
lawyers for charging too much,40 except in cases of fraudulent billings.41
Malpractice liability and litigation sanctions for overcharging would be
rare. However, the market takes up the motivation-slack for the other
three, accounting for more than a third (34%) of the total motivationweight. Doing the right thing by not overcharging, a wrongful activity
that is unlikely to be discovered, is more than half the total motivation
(51%).
Question 5. Protecting client information is a core lawyer function.
Here, more than on any other topic, lawyers say they protect client
information because it is the right thing to do (53% of the motivationweight, overall average 44%). Other factors are close to their overall
averages (discipline avoidance 12%, overall average 12%; malpractice
39. Id. at 247–48 (“In addition, in 1993, the ABA adopted the Model Recordkeeping Rule
making Model Rule 1.15 more explicit.
Some jurisdictions have specific recordkeeping
requirements, including such measures as authorization for an audit or other verification of a lawyer
trust account.”).
40. Gabriel J. Chin, Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price?
Limitations on Attorneys’ Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (“[T]he authors have
found no clear evidence that even one civil lawyer has ever been disciplined simply for charging a fee
which was too high.”).
41. Id. (“[L]awyers are frequently disciplined for improprieties in connection with fees, such as
misleading a client about how much a matter will cost, doing unnecessary work or lying about work
performed.”).
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avoidance 10% overall average 13.5%; litigation sanctions 5%, overall
average 6%; and market-reasons 17%, overall average 17%).
Question 6. Maintaining procedures for meeting deadlines implicates
litigation sanctions more than the other topics, with missing court
deadlines being predictable ways of drawing court sanctions for delay, for
obstructing discovery, for missing filing deadlines and the like. Not
surprisingly, litigation sanctions reach their peek as a motivator on this
topic (11%, almost double its average motivation of 6%). Avoiding
discipline and market reasons are close to their overall averages at 12% and
16% respectively. Malpractice motivations, a likely consequence of
missing deadlines, similar to litigation sanctions, reaches its peek on this
topic (21% of the motivation weight compared to its average of 13.5%).
Doing the right thing absorbs the loss of motivation from the peeks of
malpractice avoidance and litigation sanction avoidance, falling to by far its
lowest level, 32%, still the single greatest motivator on this as on every
other topic.
D. Differences by Age, Gender, Practice Size and Type
Additional statistical tests were run on the data to determine if there are
significant differences in responses based on age, gender, practice size and
whether the lawyer is a litigator or non-litigator.
The sampling frame for the respondents was provided by the Virginia
State Bar and contained upwards of 6,000 email addresses. Many of those
emails, however, were no longer valid and resulted in undeliverable
messages. The first wave of surveys went out in November and a followup to non-respondents was sent in December. At the end of data
collection, we had received 347 valid responses. The independent variables
were firm size, gender, age, and practice area. The dependent variables
were the series of motivations42 for engaging in specific behaviors.43 The
two measures asking about attracting clients were combined into a
“market” motivation and the two measures asking about malpractice were
combined.
We analyzed the data using a one-way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance)

42. For example, “avoid disciplinary sanctions,” “avoid malpractice liability,” “satisfy the
requirements of our malpractice carrier,” “avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions,” “retain the
continued business of our clients,’ “attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients,” and
“do the right thing without regard for other consequences.”
43. For example, conflict checks, training staff, client trust accounts, not overcharging clients,
protecting client information, and using case management software.
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between groups.44 We tested for the assumption of homogeneity-ofvariance using Levene’s test.45 We examined Welch and Brown-Forsythe
when the assumption was not met.46
The statistically significant differences are reported on the following
tables. Other differences in the response data lacked statistical significance.
Table 1: Litigator vs. Non-Litigator
Dependent

Independent

N

Mean

SD

CONFLICT_D_SANCTION NonLitigator

38

8.84

11.481

Litigator
CONFLICT_JL_SANCTION NonLitigator

107
38

15.71
4.21

19.311
6.527

Litigator

107

9.71

14.448

NonLitigator

38

2.37

4.612

Litigator

107

6.65

11.594

TRUSTS_MALPRACTICE

NonLitigator

38

8.45

13.192

TRUSTS_RIGHT

Litigator
NonLitigator

107
38

15.59
48.50

20.848
38.936

Litigator

107

32.40

37.552

NonLitigator

38

64.68

35.362

Litigator

107

48.39

39.297

38

1.71

4.073

Litigator
NonLitigator

107
38

4.83
2.89

9.303
6.939

Litigator

107

12.12

18.519

TRAINING_JL_SANC

OVERCHARGING_RIGHT

CLIENT_INFO_JL_SANCTI NonLitigator
ON
CASE_MG_JL_SANCTION

Sig.
.010
.002
.002
.017
.031
.021

.006

.003

44. See Engineering Statistics Handbook – 1.3.5.4 One-Factor ANOVA, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS AND TECH. – INFO. TECH. LABORATORY, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/
eda/section3/eda/section3/eda354.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (explaining that one-factor
ANOVA determines whether one factor has a significant effect on multiple groups of data).
45. See Engineering Statistics Handbook – 1.3.5.10 Levene Test for Equality of Variances, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. – INFO. TECH. LABORATORY, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/
handbook/eda/section3/eda35a.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (“Levene’s test is used to test of k
samples have equal variances. Equal variances across samples are called homogeneity of variance.
Some statistical tests, for example the analysis of variance, assume that variances are equal across
groups or samples. The Levene test can be used to verify that assumption.” (internal citation
omitted)).
46. Welch is reported in the summary tables.
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Table 2: Firm Size
Dependent

Independent

1–5
6–25
26+
OVERCHARGING _RIGHT 1–5
6–25
26+
TRUSTS_RIGHT

N

Mean

SD

199
66
78
199
66
78

39.96
23.98
29.36
50.75
32.44
43.95

37.648
33.027
38.058
38.383
35.694
40.348

Sig.

.003

.002

Table 3: Gender
Dependent

Independent

N

Mean

SD

TRAINING_MARKET

Male

221

13.97

21.039

Female

121

20.59

27.559

Male

221

43.45

35.755

Female

121

35.07

35.828

TRAINING_RIGHT

Sig.
.022
.040
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Table 4 : Age
Dependent
CONFLICT_JL_SANCTION

CONFLICT_RIGHT

TRAINING_JL_SANC

TRAINING_RIGHT

TRUSTS_MALPRACTICE

TRUSTS_JL_SANCTION

TRUSTS_RIGHT

OVERCHARGING_RIGHT

CLIENT_INFO_MALPRACTICE

CLIENT_INFO_JL_SANCTION

CLIENT_INFO_RIGHT

CASE_MG_MALPRACTICE

CASE_MG_JL_SANCTION

Independent
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+
<30
30–49
50+

N
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197
17
126
197

Mean
19.71
9.07
6.41
17.06
36.98
42.41
14.00
7.74
3.91
18.76
39.40
43.21
27.65
11.32
12.24
12.94
5.17
3.94
13.24
31.75
38.45
17.94
43.55
49.62
21.12
9.21
9.59
13.94
5.43
3.57
25.41
51.84
54.63
10.29
13.62
21.77
16.94
11.06
7.62

SD
20.499
12.447
9.714
27.332
35.490
34.197
13.537
11.614
7.754
28.554
36.399
35.769
23.791
15.651
17.639
15.110
9.122
8.374
22.426
37.539
37.795
30.724
39.589
37.926
16.583
13.017
13.965
12.602
9.299
7.823
27.998
35.814
36.983
12.805
17.474
24.861
18.767
17.214
13.274

Sig.
.010

.003

.001

.008

.032

.044

.001

.001

.025

.003

.001

.001

.043
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1. Not surprisingly, litigators responded somewhat broadly with greater
sensitivity to the litigation-sanction motivation. They also responded with
slightly less sensitivity to the do-the-right-thing motivation.
On four of the six topics, they responded that they were motivated by
litigation sanction to a greater degree than non-litigators. One likely
explanation is that they practice in court settings and naturally have more
concern for the obviously greater likelihood of experiencing litigation
sanctions than the non-litigators. The significance score for these
differences is high (.002, .002, .003, and .006).
On two of the six topics, they expressed less sensitivity for doing the
right thing than non-litigators. The two topics, managing trust accounts
and overcharging, may be less closely related to their litigation functions
than the other four topics. The significance score for these two differences
is much more modest than the four litigation sanction differences (.021
and .031).
2. Only two sets of responses varied significantly by firm size, with
small-practice lawyers favoring the do-the-right-thing response on the
managing trust accounts and overcharging topics.
3. The gender-related differences were quite modest. Women
respondents had a slightly heightened sensitivity to market forces, but only
as related to the single topic of training staff. Additionally, they had a
slightly reduced sensitivity to doing the right thing with respect to only the
same topic, training staff. In light of the age difference on the same topic
with older lawyers favoring the “do-the-right-thing” response, this result
may be explained by the relatively younger population of women in the
group of respondents and the bar generally. The gender differences were
of no particular note in the end, meaning the there was almost no
statistical significance to the responses given based on gender.
4. The most significant and broad response differences were found
based on the age of the respondents. By significant margins and with high
significance scores, older lawyers say they are motivated more by doing the
right thing and younger lawyers say they are motivated by the range of
legal sanctions, including discipline, malpractice, and litigation sanctions.
These differences were not confined to a few of the six topics questioned,
but instead applied to each and every one of the six, although the sharpness
of the difference was more pronounced in some topics and less in others.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It appears that lawyers care more about avoiding discipline in
predictable areas, such as maintenance of trust accounts, than in most
areas. By contrast, they seem to care very little about bar discipline in areas
of historical non-enforcement, such as fees. They seem to evaluate the
likelihood and gravity of discipline consistently with general knowledge
about the application of discipline in some areas covered by the codes more
than other areas.
Overall, malpractice avoidance may be no greater motivation than
discipline, but in predictable areas, it is the substantially greater motivator.
Likewise, litigation sanctions are a modest motivator except in areas most
likely to produce them.
The market for clients is a more powerful motivator than any lawrelated motivator, and doing the right thing is by far the greatest single
motivator of ethical conduct.
All in all, lawyers appear to behave quite rationally, being motivated by
the law and the control devices most likely to be triggered by particular
categories of misconduct.
Gender and firm size appear to have little or no effect on the responses.
By contrast, the litigation or non-litigation nature of practice, and
especially age, do appear to make significant differences in the responses.
Older lawyers appear to be more motivated by doing the right thing and
younger lawyers more on various legal sanctions.
The findings from this survey match well the predictions that would be
made by most legal ethics teachers and scholars. Our hope is that these
findings will spur further research.
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Appendix A
The goal of this survey is to explore the motivation of lawyers for acting
ethically. All responses will be anonymous and will never be linked back
to the individual respondent. The survey is being conducted for academic
purposes only and will not be shared with any state bar or agency. This
survey is not being funded by any state bar or agency. If you have any
concerns or questions, feel free to contact one of the researchers . . .
For each of the following behaviors, distribute 100 points to represent
the relative importance of each reason. The column of percentages for each
question should sum to 100%.
1. Having conflict check procedures
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of their clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
2. Training staff to be sensitive to confidentiality issues and such,
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of their clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
3. Maintaining proper client trust accounts
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of their clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
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_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
4. Not overcharging clients
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of their clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
5. Protecting client information
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of their clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
6. Using case management or other tools to meet filing and other
deadlines
_____% To avoid disciplinary sanctions
_____% To avoid malpractice liability
_____% To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier
_____% To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions
_____% To retain the continued business of their clients
_____% To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients
_____% To do the right thing without regard for other consequences
_____% Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________
Comments:
__________________________________________________________
Please provide us some information about yourself to aid in our analysis
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of the motivations for ethical conduct.
7. Which of the following best describes your legal occupation or
classification?
□ Sole practitioner
□ Partner/shareholder
□ Associate
□ Managing partner
□ Practitioner with one or more associates
□ Of counsel
□ State government attorney
□ Local government attorney
□ Federal government attorney
□ Judge
□ Corporate counsel
□ Legal aid/legal service
□ Other position (please specify) __________________________
8. What is the total number of attorneys in your firm or office?
□ One attorney
□ 2 to 5 attorneys
□ 6 to 10 attorneys
□ 11 to 25 attorneys
□ Over 25 attorneys
9. What is your primary practice area?
□ General (no one area greater than 50% of practice)
□ Bankruptcy
□ Business/corporate
□ Civil litigation – defense
□ Civil litigation – plaintiff
□ Criminal – defense
□ Criminal – prosecution
□ Estate planning
□ Family law
□ Government lawyer (non-criminal)
□ Immigration
□ Intellectual property/patent
□ Labor/employment
□ Real estate/land use/environmental
□ Tax
□ Workers’ compensation
□ Other (please specify) _________________________________
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10. Gender
□ Female
□ Male
11. Age
□ Under 30
□ 30-39
□ 40-49
□ 50-59
□ 60 or above

Appendix B
Weighted-Motivation Chart and Graphs
Total
weight

Discipline
(%)

Malpractice
(%)

Litigation
Sanctions
(%)

Market
Motivations
(%)

Doing
the
Right
Thing
(%)

Question
1

32100

15%

19%

9%

11%

42%

Question
2

31400

13

14

6

18

45

Question
3

30100

24

15

5

7

40

Question
4

31200

3

2

2

34

51

Question
5

33800

12

10

5

17

53

Question
6

30500

12

21

11

16

32

13

13.5

6

17

44

Overall
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